From: Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
To: Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-76

Subj: FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Ref: (a) 2d Battalion, 8th Marines After Action Report Concerning Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, of 17 Jan 04
(b) 1st Battalion, 6th Marines After Action Report on Operations in Afghanistan, of 5 Aug 04
(c) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines California Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) deployment After Action Report of 2 Nov 04
(d) 3d Battalion, 6th Marines After Action Report Presentation of 24 Nov 04
(e) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines After Action Report for the Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration Phase in Support of Deployment to Afghanistan of 27 Nov 04
(f) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines 90 Day After Action Report on Operations in Afghanistan, of 15 Feb 05

1. The purpose of this report is to assist in the preparation of follow-on units for operational deployment to the Afghanistan sub-theatre and to build upon the lessons learned previously cited in references (a)-(f). This after action report is presented upon completion of operations in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) that was designated TAOR Trinity. The Battalion was subsequently designated Combined Task Force (CTF) Trinity, part of CTF Thunder whose command structure was sourced from 3d Field Artillery Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army (USA). CTF Thunder is responsible for Regional Command (RC) East comprised of the Eastern portion of Afghanistan, as part of the Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76) whose command structure was sourced from the 25th Infantry Division, USA and subsequently the United States Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF). TAOR Trinity was originally composed of six Afghan Provinces roughly the size of the state of West Virginia. In order to meet the operational requirements in the assigned battle space, the Battalion organized into four maneuver companies and one provisional rifle company that provided the guard and security force at one of the five Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s) occupied by task force units. On 01 May, the Battalion conducted a relief in place (RIP) and transfer of authority (TOA) of its three southern provinces (Khowst, Paktia and Logar) with 2-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment. The Battalion consolidated into the three northern provinces (Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar) and moved the Battalion Headquarters to the newly established FOB at the Jalal Abad Airfield (JAF) and conducted a RIP and TOA with 2d Battalion, 3d Marines on 15 June 2005.

2. This report reflects after action comments, by warfighting function, generated during seven months of operations within the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA).

3. Command and Control (C2)
a. Topic: Secure Data Transfer at the Battalion Level

(1) Discussion: The large and distributed nature of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines TAOR required secure internet protocol network (SIPRNET) Voice-Over Internet Protocol (VOIP), military integrated relay chat (mIRC) and email command and control capability between split Alpha/Bravo Command elements. Secure data was also the primary C2 medium between the Battalion Combat Operations Center and subordinate companies. The Alpha and Bravo Command elements frequently performed split battalion level operations while subordinate companies were commonly driven into remote areas of Afghanistan that had no infrastructure to provide secure data capability. Today’s data intensive battlefield and limited long-haul radio capability does not facilitate information transfer between distributed command elements. The Marine Corps’ SMART-T EHF Milstar Satellite communications is not the preferred option in this theatre because it is not positioned to properly support Afghanistan and will not achieve 24-hour service. CJTF-76 made mobile Ku-Band Traffic Terminals, capable of providing SIPR, non-secure internet protocol (NIPR), and VOIP defense switch network (DSN) phone capability, available to subordinate commands.

(2) Recommendation: Suggest the Marine Corps provide a data enabler package similar to the Ku-Band Traffic Terminals for Battalion sized elements. This capability will give the Battalion Commander flexibility to displace the headquarters or subordinate units with minimal reliance on higher equipment and support. Operating a forward Command Post from the back of a High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), reliant solely on Single Channel radio is a concept that does not suit today’s battlefield. A secure data enabler package will facilitate the employment of split commands for long periods.

b. Topic: Warranty Electronic Maintenance

(1) Discussion: 3d Battalion, 3d Marines has experienced degraded communications capabilities due to inefficient warranty maintenance support from the Mantech electronic-maintenance facility in Kuwait. Warranty communications items include the Raytheon AN/PSC-5 man-pack portable satellite radio, the Harris AN/PRC-117 man-pack portable satellite radio, and the Thales AN/PRC-148 multi-band portable radio. Due to their satellite communication capability the PSC-5, PRC-117, and PRC-148 are the most widely used radio assets in the Battalion Table of Equipment. Tactical satellite radio is the only secure communications means suitable for on-the-move units to operate throughout our expansive area of responsibility.

(2) Recommendation: Establish an efficient warranty equipment maintenance process that will allow follow-on units to sustain an intense operational tempo. The following recommendations will improve warranty electronic maintenance support: 1) complete a facility in Afghanistan that will provide a forward warranty maintenance capability and significantly reduce equipment turn-around time; 2) establish a float block, available in Afghanistan, for PRC-117, PSC-5, and PRC-148 warranty maintenance radios.

c. Topic: Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) Radio Bandwidth Limitations

(1) Discussion: 3d Battalion, 3d Marines was limited to one tactical satellite radio channel that functioned as the primary command and control medium between headquarters and maneuver elements within the TAOR. TACSAT
was monitored 24 hours a day as the primary C2 means between the battalion headquarters and six forward operating bases located across the TAOR. In addition to the high radio traffic produced by internal units, 3/3 was required to share this single TACSAT channel with adjacent battalions and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Limited TACSAT resources also proved problematic to sustain maneuver, fire support and close air support (CAS) traffic during Battalion Level Operations. All air and fire support missions as well as company tactical nets utilized the single TACSAT channel. Simultaneous Troops-in-contact (TIC) scenarios would quickly flood a single TACSAT channel and make it difficult to support command and control.

(2) Recommendation: Allocate more tactical satellite resources to support operating units in Afghanistan. Dedicate one channel to each Battalion.

4. Intelligence

   a. Topic: Intelligence Personnel

      (1) Discussion: Distributed operations throughout TAOR Trinity have presented some unique intelligence challenges. At each FOB, maneuver elements are conducting intelligence and targeting synchronization meetings with all coalition agencies in the operating area, to include the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) elements, Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), and Other Coalition Forces (OCF). Company commanders develop an intelligence picture for their assigned area, coordinate with collection assets in order to support operations, and handle the processing of Enemy Combatants (EC’s). To manage these intelligence requirements, a single intelligence analyst has been assigned to three of the four maneuver companies. This has left one company and one FOB without an analyst. At the Battalion level, this has degraded the capabilities to produce intelligence products for Battalion operations.

      (2) Recommendation: In preparation for operations in this theatre, ensure all analysts are prepared to operate independently. To adequately provide intelligence support in this environment, an intelligence section staffed with a minimum of eight Intelligence Analysts, one SNCOIC, and two Intelligence Officers is recommended.

   b. Topic: Theatre Intelligence Database

      (1) Discussion: Coalition forces have been operating in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom since late 2001. In the current operating theatre, numerous coalition and Afghanistan government agencies collect intelligence information daily. Intelligence sharing is currently achieved through accessing various task force websites and reading their individual reports. At the present time, a consolidated database accessible at the tactical level does not exist to facilitate the sharing of intelligence information and assessments. Consequently, information as basic as the reliability of sources or the names of certain villages has created unnecessary confusion.

      (2) Recommendation: Timely and accurate intelligence drives operations. It is recommended that a consolidated intelligence database be developed for the Afghanistan sub-theatre that can be accessed at the task force level. A shared database, where all intelligence collection agencies and conventional ground forces enter their reports would enable all units to have a shared
view. This shared database could maintain statistics on the reliability of sources so that tactical commanders using the intelligence would know how much credence to lend to it. The database could also be organized to allow the user to sort data chronologically by source or by geographic area. The minimum information required should include village locations and assessments, source reporting to include reliability, and current threat assessments.

5. Maneuver

a. Topic: Value of Duration Operations

   (1) Discussion: The most effective method to combat the Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) is to put conventional forces in the areas from which the enemy operate (typically those areas isolated in difficult terrain) for periods of long duration. This technique puts pressure on the Medium Value Targets (MVT’s), sends a clear message that we are there to stay, and makes it too uncomfortable for insurgents to continue resistance. When done in conjunction with Civil Military Operations (CMO), it helps elicit support from the village populations to increase their own pressure on MVT’s to turn themselves in and cease their activity. In addition, it more readily leads to the surrender of lower level fighters. The bottom line is that duration operations are normally more effective than targeted detentions where gaining viable, actionable intelligence and isolating the objective area are problematic and alienating the surrounding populace is more likely. A perfect example of this occurred in the Kunar Province, where Najmudeen accepted allegiance and reconciled with the government, and several other MVT’s that operated in that area have fled to Pakistan because of the sustained Battalion presence.

   (2) Recommendation: When conducting operations against insurgents, it is vital to win the support of the local populace and demonstrate a commitment to putting an end to the insurgency. Units operating in that type of environment should plan to conduct sustained duration operations for a minimum of five days.

b. Topic: Combined Joint Special Operations Area (CJSOA) Border Battle Space

   (1) Discussion: The Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams operating in the JSOA do not have enough personnel or combat power to adequately deter the border areas from enemy infiltration and exploitation. This creates an AQAM safe haven, and creates force protection issues in other areas. The porous border areas have allowed weapons and personnel to be smuggled into the inner areas of the province and used against coalition forces. The safe haven area also allows AQAM forces to launch rocket attacks, stage ordnance, and setup supply lines in relative safety. This is all done in an area where the populace is either supportive of the activity or submissive enough to allow it to happen. The assignment of battle space based on terrain and not functional capabilities has proven to be ineffective.

   (2) Recommendation: Deconflict operations between conventional and special operations forces by function, and not by geographic boundaries. The key terrain in a counter-insurgency is human, not geographic. The ODA teams have a significant capability that cannot be discounted; however, they simply do not have the manpower to put forces near the border in order to
significantly inhibit enemy infiltration. The JSOA should be dissolved, and conventional forces should be used to maintain an aggressive force presence in the areas closest to the border. Rather than focus on battlespace or geographic terrain, the ODA teams would be better served by focusing on training the border patrol (Foreign Internal Defense) and Human Intelligence Collection throughout the CJOA. Meanwhile, the conventional forces can seal off the gaps between the border checkpoints and they can perform duration operations in those areas to establish rapport with the indigenous population in order to deny the enemy the critical human terrain; this would effectively cut AQAM supply lines to Pakistan.

c. Topic: Requirement for decentralized assault support

(1) Discussion: Due to the challenging terrain and substandard road network in Afghanistan, assault support is required to obtain a positional advantage and maintain operational tempo over the AQAM. Due to the limited number of helicopters in theatre, both aircrew and aircraft have become high demand, low-density commodities, in which numerous organizations compete for support. As a result of the limited number of assets, it is extremely challenging to execute operations on actionable, time sensitive intelligence. Due to the competitive nature of helicopter re-sourcing, planning deliberate operations is subject to helicopter availability and not dictated by the operational commander’s needs. Instead of focusing on the threat, valuable time and momentum is lost to determining if and when a helicopter package can be assembled to support an operation. Additionally, the helicopters are routinely “weathered in” at Bagram Airfield during periods when they could fly in the more temperate areas of Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman Provinces. This is routinely the case during the winter months as visibility and conditions prohibit flying across the intervening mountain range. Helicopter operations provide the operational commander with tactical flexibility and maneuverability; however, this advantage is lost due to the centralized nature of assault support and limited assets in theater.

(2) Recommendation: Having the capability to respond with overwhelming force in a timely manner increases the potential for success. The short-term affect of not being able to support a service support function must be compared in context with the long-term affects of denying, disrupting, or destroying AQAM. In order to balance logistics requirements and operational needs, CJTF-76 should conduct a study to determine the feasibility of establishing a helicopter support package, solely to support the operations of the task force maneuver commander, at the Jalal Abad Airfield. The helicopter package should consist of two CH-47 helicopters, one UH-60 helicopter, and two AH-64 helicopters. This package would provide the flexibility to conduct numerous missions throughout the assault support spectrum. The CHs would enable the Battalion to insert a sizable reaction force in one wave. This is especially important during the summer months when the aircraft combat load will be reduced due to warmer temperatures and less lift capability by the helicopters. The displacement of helicopters to Jalal Abad Airfield would give the Battalion the ability to act on time sensitive targets as well as maintain combat momentum dictated by mission requirements.

d. Topic: Training the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)

(1) Discussion: If Afghanistan is ever to make the transition from martial law to civil law, it is imperative that the ANP and the ANA be
perceived by the populace as fair and competent. A key aspect of our Stability and Support Operations (SASO) mission has been the professional development of ANP forces and the military training of the ANA. We worked throughout TAOR Trinity to increase the capabilities of the local ANP forces and the ANA operating in our area. We conducted significant numbers of joint patrols with the ANP and ANA, training with them and conducting joint missions. It is important that these crucial forces are manned, trained and equipped to perform their duties. We worked to standardize this training throughout the TAOR to ensure uniformity and consistency. One element that has proven to be challenging is the varying levels of experience and skill sets within the Battalion to conduct this training. When training a police force, there are unique law enforcement and security techniques that are not normally on an Infantry Battalion Mission Essential Task List (METL).

(2) Recommendation: While the METL’s for the ANA are compatible with the training our military receives, it would be beneficial to learn the basics of security force operations and policing techniques to support the training of the ANP. If possible, local Police agencies and Military Police could teach a basic course to all Officers, SNCO’s and NCO’s. This course should cover techniques for establishing a beat, interviewing techniques, investigative tools and techniques, making arrests, processing personnel and evidence, and other police specific tasks. Additionally at least one Military Police (MP) Marine/Soldier should be attached to each company in order to provide instructor expertise. Although the preferred method would be for the Department of Justice or International Community to dedicate sufficient police trainers to this task, that currently is not the case.

e. Topic: Convoys and Mounted Patrols during Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP)

(1) Discussion: The PTP as a familiarization period is absolutely critical to units that are unaccustomed to being a mobile force. The regular rifle platoons need to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) and a general comfort level in the constant use of vehicle movement over long distances, using vehicles in a patrol base, and the logistical load and sustainability of a vehicular patrol.

(2) Recommendation: Long range vehicular patrols, and offensive and defensive operations as a mobile force all need to be included in the PTP evolution. A convoy assault course is good training to immediate action drill standards; however, it does not breed the familiarity required for the conduct of extended vehicular operations. This should include a comprehensive package that covers the following: vehicles in the defense, vehicles in the offense, logistical loads of a vehicular patrol, formations for movement, movement in restrictive terrain, night-driving familiarization, vehicle towing and emergency maintenance, as well as the convoy procedures and immediate action drills.

f. Topic: Interpreter Training during PTP

(1) Discussion: During PTP units conducted SASO training, which covered everything from vehicular convoys to interacting with the locals. Through the entire evolution, however, Marines were able to understand the role players. This did not adequately prepare Marines for the growing pains associated with having to use an interpreter.
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(2) Recommendation: Attempt to incorporate interpreters into the PTP in
order to prepare Marines for the friction of operating in environments where
the local populace does not openly speak the same language.

g. Topic: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP’s)

(1) Discussion: The following TTP’s have been developed as a result of
operations conducted in Afghanistan:

(a) For IED preventive measures: ensure thorough pre-combat
convoy briefs, rehearsals and back briefs; ensure Marines are wearing their
helmet, outer tactical vests with SAPI plates, ballistic eye protection and
seat belts; conduct operational checks of the ACORN and WARLOCK devices as
part of unit pre-combat inspections; ensure that ACORN’s are positioned
appropriately in the convoy so that all vehicles are under coverage; vary
patterns and avoid routines; know where historical IED sites are and dismount
to check those locations when trafficking through them; travel high threat
areas during hours of darkness; request electronic counter-measure “burns” in
support of routes you know you are going to traffic; and, most importantly,
gain and maintain the support of local population along the routes you most
frequently travel.

(b) During duration security missions outside of the FOB, posture
to win the fire fight when setting into your patrol base by: positioning
observation posts on the high ground; analyzing potential infiltration routes
and conducting security and ambush patrols along those routes; displaying
false dispositions during the day and moving into a more viable defense after
dark; and conducting security patrols at RPG maximum effective range (from
which the AQAM most frequently initiate their attacks).

(c) To the maximum extent possible, establish habitual
relationships between units and villages/districts in order to foster trust
and produce human intelligence.

(d) Ensure unit interpreters monitor ICOM radios continuously
when outside the FOB. The AQAM habitually use their ICOM radios to
coordinate attacks.

(e) Conduct duration security/presence missions for a minimum of
five or more days. Only after that amount of time do Afghans typically begin
to provide useful information.

(f) Always validate human intelligence through multiple sources.
Never act on single source intelligence unless the source has reported
multiple times accurately. Be consistently aware of Afghan “blood feuds.”

(g) As much as possible, involve and adhere to the wishes of
district sub-governors, elders and mullahs when conducting search operations.

(h) Whenever possible, have the ANP and/or ANA conduct searches
and targeted detentions to put an “Afghan face” on the operation.

(i) Ensure Marines engage in conversation with the local
population while unit leaders focus on engaging district or village leaders.
(j) Incorporate tactical HUMINT teams (THT) into civil military operations such as medical capabilities (MEDCAP) evolutions so that they use those operations to assist in gaining human intelligence.

(k) Leverage Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs teams wherever possible.

(l) Always combine targeted detention operations with robust, follow-on civil military operations and humanitarian assistance in the targeted area. Remain in the area and discuss the detention with the village leaders. Avoid the perception that all Coalition Forces do is conduct searches and detain people.

(m) Disguise and protect informants.

(n) Produce and distribute business cards with point of contact information during village assessments and duration security missions. Afghans often will not speak in front of others, but they will arrange a private meeting to provide intelligence if they have contact information.

(o) Continually assess the enemy’s information operations campaign and aggressively counter it.

(p) Maintain an Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) in the Battalion Combat Operations Center. The IOWG should consist of the Fire Support Coordinator, the Civil Affairs Officer, the Tactical Psychological Team SNCOIC, the THT SNCOIC, and the Public Affairs NCO/Combat Correspondent. The IOWG should use the effects based fires methodology to address targets with information operations. When the enemy makes a mistake (such as inadvertently rocketing a mosque), the IOWG should immediately meet, develop an IO campaign to exploit the issue to include talking points, radio scripts, fliers, etc. and force it down to the subordinate units for their rapid implementation. Similarly, when friendly forces make a mistake (such as shoot someone trapped in the crossfire), the IOWG should develop an IO campaign to mitigate the fall out in the effected community.

(2) Recommendation: Follow on units should incorporate these TTP’s when conducting operations in Afghanistan.

6. Logistics

   a. Topic: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSO&I) Team in support of the Battalion

   (1) Discussion: A small team of logistics representatives from 3d Marine Regiment and 3d Marine Division was put together to help facilitate, the RSO&I of personnel and equipment into theater. The team was task organized to coordinate with Marine Forces Pacific (MARPORPAC), Central Command (CENTCOM), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), Movement Control Battalion, and CJTF-76 to handle embarkation, transportation, and supply issues at the theatre level and below. Where there was no representation, they acted as the Marine liaison with each of these agencies to ensure the Battalion’s needs were met. They also provided leadership, advice, and guidance for the Deployed Unit Support Team (DUST) and other members of the Battalion’s Advance Echelon (ADVON) as they prepared the way for the Battalion to operate in the theatre.
(2) Recommendation: There is a need to have, at a minimum, an experienced field grade logistician from within the chain of command dedicated to ensuring that the logistics throughput is as seamless as possible for Marine Corps units as they move from the Continental United States (CONUS) into theater and finally to their assigned TAOR. Infantry battalions do not typically have the personnel or experience to manage this alone. Having an RSO&I team is a combat multiplier, which quickly fills that need without taking away manpower from the unit to accomplish the same tasks. It would also prove useful for the unit’s redeployment as well.

b. Topic: Survey of Non-Table of Equipment (T/E) Items

(1) Discussion: A Battalion equipment survey was conducted for all Non-Table of Equipment items. Each company was given a survey in order to rate and comment on the items durability and user satisfaction; user satisfaction and durability were rated on a scale of 1 to 10.

(2) Recommendation: Based on the results of the survey, it is recommended that the Non-T/E Items that a unit purchases prior to operations in theatre include the following: equip each squad with a digital camera and hand held metal detector; each Forward Air Controller (FAC) should be outfitted with an Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/ Designator (IZLID); purchase extra thumb pads and wiring for the Sure Fire lights; elbow and kneepads; “Garmin Etrex” global positioning system; “ESS” goggles; Nalgene bottles, holders and cups; Polar Tech In Sport tee-shirts style number N875; drop holsters (for Marines issued a pistol); and gaiters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>NSN</th>
<th>SATISFACTION (10 VERY SATISFIED AND 1 NOT SATISFIED)</th>
<th>DURABILITY (10 VERY DURABLE AND 1 NOT DURABLE)</th>
<th>SURVEY COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PORTABLE GENERATOR</td>
<td>703501T00C836</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1) Efficient and effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZLID POSITIONAL LA</td>
<td>660501W00K560</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1) This is a great piece of gear. Great enabler for CAS talk-on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLOSIVES DETECTOR</td>
<td>685001R02L121</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1) Companies need kits to gather evidence after engagements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUREFIRE MOUNT LIGHT</td>
<td>691001W00K561</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1) The thumb pad wire always breaks. 2) Blinds opponents. 3) Batteries do not last.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILEY X GOGGLES (V-CUT)</td>
<td>4240015107844</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1) Covers and protects eyes. 2) These goggles were uncomfortable. 3) Replace with a different model. 4) Goggles fog easily. 5) Lens get scratched very easy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILEY X GOGGLES</td>
<td>4240015040994</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1) Lenses scratch easily, and it is not dark enough. 2) Goggles fog instantly. 3) Don’t fit head well.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ELBOW PADS
- **Part Number**: 424001R02K101
- **Quantity**: 8
- **Remarks**:
  1) Protects elbows and uniforms.
  2) Keep this gear.
  3) Very comfortable.

### HAND-HELD METAL DETECTOR
- **Part Number**: 666501R02K416
- **Quantity**: 8
- **Remarks**: 1) Works well in this AO.
  2) Need formal training for some Marines.
  3) Takes long to calibrate.

### INSPECTION MIRROR, W/CASTER WHEELS MOUNT
- **Part Number**: 129001W00K434
- **Quantity**: 6
- **Remarks**: 1) Not widely used in AO.

### INSPECTION MIRROR, W/LIGHT
- **Part Number**: 129001W00K435
- **Quantity**: 6
- **Remarks**: 1) Works very well for night VCP

### INSPECTION MIRROR, W/EXTENSION
- **Part Number**: 129001W00K436
- **Quantity**: 6
- **Remarks**: 1) Prevents lack of security.

### MAGNUM SPIKE SYSTEM
- **Part Number**: 567501R02M109
- **Quantity**: 6
- **Remarks**: 1) Not really used.

### HELL STROM NEOPRENE KNEE PADS
- **Part Number**: 691001W00K559
- **Quantity**: 6
- **Remarks**: 1) Not well when used alone.
  2) Tear easy.

### HELL STROM NEOPRENE ELBOW PADS
- **Part Number**: TBD
- **Quantity**: 6
- **Remarks**: 1) Not well when used alone.
  2) Tear easy.

### CYBER SHOT CAMERA
- **Part Number**: 672001W00J791
- **Quantity**: 8
- **Remarks**: 1) Companies need more cameras.

### ESS GOGGLES
- **Part Number**: 599901W00K558
- **Quantity**: 8
- **Remarks**: 1) ESS doesn't fog up.
  2) Need cushion.
  3) Oakley are better (need fans).
  4) Kind of big.

### KNEE PADS
- **Part Number**: 4240014938335
- **Quantity**: 8
- **Remarks**: 1) Always used.
  2) Protects knees/clothes.
  3) Very comfortable.

### NALGENE BOTTLES
- **Part Number**: TBD
- **Quantity**: 8
- **Remarks**: 1) Always used, never breaks.
  2) Need to purchase drinking lid. Good piece of gear.

### NALGENE BOTTLE HOLDERS
- **Part Number**: TBD
- **Quantity**: 8
- **Remarks**: 1) Attaches well w/equipment.
  2) Need more.
  3) Should be tan.

### NALGENE CUPS
- **Part Number**: TBD
- **Quantity**: 7
- **Remarks**: 1) Handles bends easily.
  2) Not needed item.
  3) Camouflage vice silver.
  4) Better than old canteen cups.
  5) Cracks easy.

### GAITER
- **Part Number**: N/A
- **Quantity**: 9
- **Remarks**: 1) Good unless snow is higher than the knees.
  2) Works well with snow shoes.

### SLED
- **Part Number**: N/A
- **Quantity**: 9
- **Remarks**: 1) Great for dragging gear.

### SNOW SHOES
- **Part Number**: N/A
- **Quantity**: 9
- **Remarks**: 1) Works well.

### Drop Holsters
- **Part Number**: N/A
- **Quantity**: 7
- **Remarks**: 1) Great piece of gear.
  2) They ruin uniforms and the belt.

### Test T-Shirts (Polar Tech In
- **Part Number**: N/A
- **Quantity**: 8
- **Remarks**: 1) They are awesome.
  2) The long sleeve
7. **Fires**

a. **Topic: Effective Targeting and Tracking Non-Kinetic Fires**

(1) **Discussion:** To ensure effective targeting with non-kinetic fires, the Battalion tracked the distribution of Humanitarian Affairs (HA) supplies and Commanders Emergency Response Projects (CERP). The following information was tracked to make certain non-kinetic fires were being used to support operations in the TAOR: type of kinetic round (blanket, well project), designated target (grid, village, name of recipient), desired effect on target (e.g. reward for information, support of ANP), and battle damage assessment (e.g. unexploded ordnance turned in). The Battalion focused CERP funds based on location and the non-kinetic capability to provide security and stability in the TAOR. Geographic priority was based on the highest threat to stability in conjunction with the S-2 intelligence assessment. Projects were chosen based on their security and stability effects (e.g. communications for the ANP, vehicles for the ANP, mosque refurbishments). As a result of these projects, the Battalion achieved the desired effect by increased cooperation with the local leaders and the voluntary turn over of numerous weapons and ammunition caches.

(2) **Recommendation:** Establish a plan early on for implementing non-kinetic fires. This must include the desired effects on target and the amount/type of non-kinetic fire available. It would be helpful to have each company track their non-kinetic fires on their daily situation report to maintain a record of base information. Continue to utilize a detailed assessment of Civil Military Operations prepared by the civil affairs team for planning and focusing Battalion non-kinetic fires.

8. **Point of contact** is the Operations Officer, Major A. T. Priddy, at DSN: 318.231.8612 or via email **SAL.MAR.S3@CJTF76.centcom.smil.mil**.

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CTF Devil
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3d Marine Division
3d Marine Regiment
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
1st Battalion, 3d Marines